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THE ALIENATION OF MAORI LAND UNDER PART XXII I AND S. 438 
OF THE MAORI AFFAIRS ACT, 1953 
" Sit, Governor, sit, a governor for us - for me, 
for all, that our lands may remain with us - that 
those fellows and creatures who sneak about, sticking 
to rocks and to the sides of brooks and gullies, may 
not have it all. Sit, Governor, sit, for me, for us. 
Remain here, a father for us ... " (1) 
The above \vords contain a symbolic wealth of the issues arising in 
any treatment of Maori land. This paper will look at the 
alienation of Maori land under multiple ownership through Part 
XXIII of the Maori Affairs Act, 1953 and in doing so will present 
some of the issues and ironies present in the impassioned words. 
Section 2 of the principa l Act gives a comprehensive definition 
of the Kord "alienation" 1vh ich can include any "transfer, sale, 
gift, lease, licence ..... '' (2) The emphasis in this paper will 
be on the sale and transfer of the land for it is in this area 
that <:r3 mo~t controversy arises. For the purposes of ·c1tis paper 
"multiple ownership" means any Maori freehold land (as described 
. in S. 215) being land owned for a legal estate in fee simple by 
more than ten owners as tenants-in-common. Section 215 lays down 
exclusively the processes by which a particular owner may alienate 
land. To the owner the most significant method is the last one 
listed in the Section - an alienation by means of Part XXIII of 
the Act which requires a duly staged meeting of owners. Section 
438 of the Act, which is seen as complementary to Part XXIII, gives 
the ~laori Land Court power to vest land in trustees in order to 
facilitate the use, management or alienation of any Maori freehold 
land. This pmver is essentially in the hands of the Court although 
there can be no doubt that its use of S.438 is sensitive to 
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external influences and is not simply a mechanism the Court 
triggers of its own accord. Broadly speaking there is a divergence 
in attitudes towards land between Maori and Pakeha. The Maori 
perceived land in a spiritual and ancestral context (3) whilst the 
Pakeha settlers brought with them the utilist concept of land as 
"an individually owned, freely marketable entre-
preneurial resource" (4) 
To a large extent, as this paper will indicate, this divergence 
of views is still present. 
In recent times various Maori organisations (5) have expressed 
concern at the continuing alienation of t,1aori land, By and large 
this fear extends to the alienation of Maori land under multiple 
ownership for it is within this land that the cultural and 
communal value of land arises. For instance there was relatively 
little controvcrsly over Part 1 of the 1967 Maori Affairs 
Amendment /\et (b) which changed the status of Maori land owned by 
four persons or less to that of general land. The 11.laori accepted, 
for the most part, that the land affected by Part I was being used 
by their people in the 'pakeha' way and hence no cultural 
significance attached to this land. The question however of the 
compulsory acquisition of uneconomic shares in multiply-o,med land 
brought a loud reaction from the 11.!aori because of the way it 
impinged upon and took away from a lot of them something cherished 
- their turangawaewae (7). Section 23 of the 1974 Maori Affairs 
Amendment Act (the Rata Amendment) abolished the conversion of 
uneconomic interests but the issue presented an indication of how 
important the institution of multiple-ownership is to the Maori. 
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It is too simplistic to say that there is a straight divergence 
of views - the pakeha-settler ethic versus the Maori communal 
concept. With the passage of time there has inevitably been a 
cultural 'rub-off' of either race on to each other (8). What is 
the Maori concept today? Undoubtedly some pakeha elements have 
become part of the view. Kawharu draws a distinction between 
rural tribal attitudes and those of the urban migra~t , or 
absentee owner. He says: 
"Rural tribal settlements are therefore neither fully 
European nor fully Maori. What gives their values a 
unique character is the aggregate of individual, a 
not always consistent, choice between those values 
th2.t are customary, kinship-oriented, and Maori and 
those that are not. For the migrant, on the other 
hand, or rather the absentee O\.\rner, beliefs and 
attitudes are much more closely meshed in with those 
or suburbia. The few dilemmas.with which he may grapple 
are comparatively abstract and personalised and 
without social consequences for the triba l community."(9) 
Kawharu's words (and indeed most of his books) were written 
before the ~laori land march in late 1975. The effect of the 
march upon the 'migrants' has been marked and largely unexpected -
it has enabled them to 'rediscover their roots' and the importance 
in retaining their ownership (even if it is of little economic 
value). Hence there is an um,illingness amongst urban migrants to 
sell their shares and so Kawharu 1 s distinction is, in 1978, less 
justifiable. The Maori concept of land today, for both urban and 
rural Maori, retains the essential elements of communism, self-
identity and status despite the inroads of the pakeha \vorld. 
There is an old saying that it takes judicial decision up to 20 
years to reflect any change Nithin the community's view. In 1961 
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the Government officially dropped its policy of assimilation (10) 
however for a long time the concept of assimilation largely 
dominated the Maori Land Court's notion of 'helping' the Maoris, 
(11) The policy of assimilation resulted from the pakeha's 
seemingly arrogant assumption that his way of life was best and 
the one for the Maori 'by hook or by crook' . Seventeen years 
after the abandonment of assimilation the writer believes a shift 
in the Maori Land Court's approach is discernible - the Court, in 
general, now seems to be intent not upon 'assimilation' but rather 
to protect the separate system of tenure and all the values that 
the Maori land system represents. It is a laudabl e change in 
direction. 
In the light of the above this paper will first investigate the 
hi story of Part XXIII since 1953 in both its legislative form and 
judicial use. Secondly the paper will look at S. 438. It is the 
writer's v.i.ew that S.42>8 ..:untains some undesirable elements and 
that these elements can be removed without hindering the purposes 
of the section. 
PART 23 
Part XXIII ,vas largely a pakeha response to the ~!aori notion of 
communal ownership. Without delving into history too much, one of 
the most significant concepts the white settler brought was the 
notion of land as an individually o,med freely marketable 
commodity - The new rulers very early started the process of 
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individualisation of land title so that they could legitimately 
secure title. The process tried to take account of ~iaori custom 
but it seems that this attention to custom was a subterfuge for 
the settler's aim of acquiring control of land (12). The indi-
vidulisation process only clumsily followed Maori custom - for 
instance it could find no room for the ariki's power of veto which 
was a central feature of Maori custom. (13) 
Land came to be vested as a legal estate in fee simple amongst 
various ha_.eus and shares were apportioned. The passage of time saw 
ownership become fragmented and the number of shares accordingly 
increase. Part XXIII of the Maori Affairs Act 1953 is an attempt 
to deal with land under r.iultiple ownership by a democratic and 
formalised process of calling meetings of o,mers. Today meetings 
of owners have become a cultural institution to the Maori. They 
can be called for a variety of reasons (specified in the Act) since 
the land is owned by them as tenants-in-common, all of whom have 
the right to consult and be consulted (14). IRevitably many cultural 
' 
factors determine the decisions and resolutions made at a Part XXIII 
meeting. As such they arc perhaps more of interest from the social 
science aspect than the legalistic. (15) The main attention of 
this paper will be on a legalistic side of Part XXIII though 
questions relating to social aspects must necessarily arise. 
The po,vers of the ~1aori Land Court under Part XXI II of the Act can 
be put under two headings: 
(a) power to summon a meeting of owners 
(b) power to confirm, modify or disallow a resolution passed at 
a meeting 
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i. power to look at procedure and conduct of the 
meeting 
ii. power to look at the content of the resolution 
The Court has long determined that an application made under 
S.307 of the Act for a direction of the Court suITL~oning a meeting 
of assembled owners is a separate and distinct proceeding from an 
application to confirm a resolution thorugh the latter flows 
from or has its origins in the earlier proceedings. (16) The 
Court has, therefore, divided its powers concerning Part XXIII 
into the two distinct compartments and it is best to discuss each 
power individually. 
TIIE COURT'S USE or TIIESE POWERS 1953 - 1974 
(a) PO\ver to Summon Meetings of Owners 
This power was granted by S.307 of the Act. The section provided 
in what circumstances and for what purposes various parties might 
make an application to the Court for a meeting of O\mers. The 
Court upon receipt of the application and subject to its own 
discretion (17) then directed the Registrar of the itaori Land 
Court to call a meeting of owners. The application must contain 
a search of the Maori Land Court title showing the derivation of 
the interests of the present owners, as well as a list in 
alphabetical order of the names and addresses of the present 
mmers. (18) An application by a proposing alienee \vas normally 
processed as a matter of course except where the Court believed he 
had insufficient finance to proceed and the meeting \vould there-
fore be a waste of time. Furthermore the old S.370 stipulated 
that no meeting could be declared invalid because any owner failed 
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to receive notice of the meeting. However a distinction can 
possibly be drawn between that type of situation and the instance 
where a person affected by an order of the Court had no notice of 
the proceedings and therefore no chance of presenting their 
case. (19) Moreover regulation 3 of the Maori Assembled Owners 
Regulations 1957 requires the Registrar to send notices to every 
owner. Section 308 requires a statement of the terms of every 
proposed resolution that is to be submitted to the meeting be 
attached to the notices. The purpose was to prevent the assembled 
owners being 'taken by surprise' though ,:his purpose was not always 
achieved. The 1967 Amendment did not affect the operation of the 
Court's power in this area. The Court applied the power routinely 
and without significant controversy until 1974. 
(b) Power to Confirm, Modify or Disallow a Resolution 
(i) Power to Investigate Conduct and Procedure at Meetings 
This power is separate from power to look at the content of the 
resolution because it is quite possible for the Court to disallow 
~ resolution on the basis of some irregularity when the content 
of that resolution is quite innocuous, i.e. no link between 
procedure and content is necessary. 
The pre 1967 S.227 ss 1 (a) quite clearly gave the Court power to 
look at the conduct and procedure of a Part XXIII meeting so far 
as resolutions of alienation were concerned. The Court by virtue 
of S.227 ss 6 had discretionary power to confirm the alienation 
despite any informality or irregularity in the mode of execution 
of the resolution if it was satisfied the irregularity was 
immaterial. If however the irregularity made a material difference 
/8 ... 
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the Court could find that the instrument of alienation was not 
duly executed and make such order as it saw fit. (20) 
The 1967 Amendment Act repealed (inter alia) S.227 ss l(a) and 
ss 6 so that the Court's position seemed a little confused. 
Sections 314 and 317 indirectly continued the Court's power to 
look at procedure. Moreover the Court, quite naturally saw this 
power as being conferred by the mere existence of the formal 
provisions so that 1967 Amendment Act made no difference to the 
Court's Po""'~r to look at procedure. The difficulty arises as to 
what the Court can do upon finding that an irregularity has 
occurred. Does the abs ence of ss 6 mean that the Court nmv has no 
discretion to di s regard the irregularity (if i t i s an immaterial 
one) and i s obliged to call for another meeting of owners whenever 
any irregularity, however trivial is proved before the Court? As 
this paper will show, old habits die hard in the Maori Land Court 
and the better view would seem to be, in the absence of any 
decision on the point, that the discretionary power to ignore an 
immaterial irregularity survived despite ss 6 repeal. This view 
is sustainable by virtue of the fact that the Court has power to 
look at procedur~ that it is a 'Court of the people' (22) and must 
exercise its power over immaterial irregularities in a way that 
serves the people i.e. on a discretionary basis. It does not serve 
the people to have them recalled for another meeting to pass the 
' same resolution simply because of a minor and i mmaterial technicality. 
S.310 requires a Recording Officer being either the Registrar of 
the Court or an officer of the Department to attend the meetings. 
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Because the Maori Land Court is "a Court of the people" the 
Recording Officer has a degree of discretion as to how to conduct 
the meeting. He may, for example, go to a vehicle outside the 
building where the meeting is being held and record the vote of a 
person too sick to enter the building (23). The Court however 
retains power to rule upon the Recording Officer's use of his 
discretion. The Recording Officer is also responsible to ensure 
that every owner's right to be heard is observed. The Court's 
approach to this aspect has not been affected by legislative change, 
irnl-i-vi<luals entitled to VE}t-e-h-ad to be p-resent c.4:tring the-wlw-l-e-
t.i11H~- 0-~eet:ing. In----±-%7 the qt,0-F1,Hn requirements Here ---t-i-gR-t-
S4-~Erf-1=-h-e-Haori P.1:1-T-pe-ses Act l-967. The Court th-u-s-h-ad 
p0wer (only upon application-) to fix a quorum for a~i-A.g. 
t-h-e--t-e--t-a-1-Rumber of e-wne-:F-5-{w-h-ichever Has the less) and-the owne..r-S 
6: ons-t-i-t-ut-i-itg-t h-i-s-ql:Htt'um-had t e mm not 1 o s s t~n e qu a:r t e±-o f 
th~-ben.e.£-i~a.-l- f.r-e0-hold in.w.rest in the land in respect of which 
t-h~-mee-1:-i-ng was called. 
ea~y:....-A-minorit)L-Could pass a reso1H-t-i{m-e-f--a-l-i0fl-rtt-ie-R--i-fl-t+l~face 
to-t.hi.s-s.ec.ti.on; the 01,,mers all receive notices and have equal 
epportunity to c--0me and express their opinion, if they do not come 
i t~r 01m fault and displays thett'--±-fr~f-i-n-t:-eT-e-s-~r.1-a-e-r-i-s 
/ 10 , , -'-=-~-=--======~.-~ 
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To constitute a quorum up until 1974 under S309 ss(l), three 
individuals entitled to vote l1ad to be present during the whole 
time of the meeting. In 1967 the quorum requirements were tightened 
up to a certain extent by the new sections 6A - 6C added by S4 ss(4) 
of the Maori Purposes Act 1967. The Court thus had power (only upon 
application) to fix a quorum for any meeting. Where no quorum was fixed 
I' ' 
it has to be ten owners or one quarter of the total number of owners 
(\vhichever was the less) and the owners cons ti tu ting this quorum had to 
own not less than one-quarter of the beneficial freehold interest in 
the land in respect of which the meeting was called. 
These quorum requirements made the alienation of land relatively easy. 
A minority could pass a resolution of alienation in the face of a silent 
or unknown majority. The pakeha applied his rationale to this section; 
the owners all receive notices and have equal opportunity to come and 
express their opinion, if they do not come it is their own fault and 
displays their lack of interest. Maoris gathered together do not 
necessarily follow the pakcl1a system which assumes complete knowledge and 
unfettered willingness to express opinion (24). Moreover in many 
situations 
" that the idioms and concepts are beyond the 
majority is usually clear in 'post mortem' exchanges'' (25) 
In legislative form, therefore, this provision refl ected the 
pakeha concept of 'democracy' - a concept the Maori has never 
really been at home with. 
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The Court's attitude to proxies has always been strict and 
precise (as shown in Re Matahina AlD). Up until 1968 the Maori 
Assembled Owners Regulations provided that the proxy for an owner 
could only be another owner or the wife or husband of an owner (26). 
In 1968 in accordance with the Prichard-Waetford Report's (:i.1) rec-
ommendation that restrictions on the alienation of Maori land should 
be relaxed regulation 7(2) was revoked and replaced by a provision 
which allowed "any person of full age and capa~i ty" to be appointed 
proxy for ·an owner. The 1968 amendment to the Regulations also made 
it compulsory to fill in a proxy form as laid do1m in the schedule to 
the Amendment. The proxy giver can limit the proxy's authority (Regulation 
10(1)). If a person who has appointed a proxy attends the meeting then 
the proxy cannot vote for him - Regulation 10(2). However if the proxy 
giver arrives after voting has commenced this is too late to revoke the 
pTOX)' (2'3). Regulation 11 provides foT the manner in which notices of 
proxy must be given to the Recording Officer. 
ii. Power to Look at the Content of the Resolution 
Up untll 1967 this power was regarded by the Court a~ its major 
'quasi-parental' power. The Court could by S227 ssl(b) disallow 
or modify any resolution if it believed the alienation "contrary to 
equity or good faith, or to the interests of the Maori alienating" . 
Section 227 prescribed other considerations the Court could take 
into account, notably that the alienation would not result in 
undue aggregation of farm land and that the consideration was 
adequate. 
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How then did the Court use this discretion? The Prichard-Waetford 
Report (29) analysed the Maori Land Court's use of S227 and recommended 
that S227 ssl(b) be repealed: 
"This will result in the price in the case of a sale 
and the rent in and terms in the case of a lease and 
the rate of interest and terms in the case of a mortgage 
being the primary matters for the Court to decide" . (30) 
The Committee's dissatisfaction with S227 ssl(b) arose because: 
" ... the individual approach of many Judges to 
questions of alienation have been coloured by the 
belief that it has been and is a function of the Court, 
except in very special circumstances, to preclude the 
alienation of land by Maoris". (31) 
They echoed the view that the Act was not aimed at the protection 
and preservation of f\laori land as such. 
" ... the A.::t is designed, and can only be applied, as o. 
Statute protecting the Maori from his own improvidence in 
respect of his dealings with the land in contrast with the 
land itself" . (32) 
The Co1mni ttee then went on in paragraph 135 to give illustrations of how 
it thought ssl(b) was being 'misused ' by the Maori Land Court bench: 
''We agree that some Judges have assumed that their dnty is 
to refuse sales. 1-lence the complaint elsewhere of a Judge 
saying 'This is not your land - you are only a trustee for 
it.' If such is being or has been said, and we accept it 
that it has, our comment is justified" . 
6 ' 
- 13 -
Yet the Committee undermines its argument when it notes that: 
"The position has not been helped by all appeals 
against refusal of confirmation or against variation 
of the contract having, so far as we have ascertained, 
failed." (33) 
The Chairman of the Corruni ttee, Ivor Prichard, a former Chief Judge 
of the !,laori Land Court, would have been sitting on most of those 
appeals and the Chief Judge (34)has traditionally h~d an influential 
presence. If all those appeals had failed, surely there were good 
grounds for their not succeeding? Neither does the Committee produce · 
\ 
evidence as to what the resolutions that had been refused contained. It 
is highly likely that the Judge who in one district confirmed only six 
sales in a whole year, disallowed the others because the consideration was 
not adequate or on grounds of undue aggregation. Anyway - how many 
resolutions of sale did that particular Judge face during the year? 
The Committee seemed to advance the argument that the Court was not 
confirming as many resolutions of alienat ion as it should. They blamed 
the attitude of the bench and S227 ssl(b). However statistics indicate 
that the rerno":tl of S227 ssl (b) did nor materially increa53 the number 
of Part XXIII alienations (35) - that is, the contention that the bench 
was using, ssl(b) to disallow many resolutions that should have gone 
through was not sustainable. 
In para 136 an example is given of the Court's refusal to allow an 
alienation of land under multiple ownership to a ~Iaori Incorporation. 
The Court refused to confirm because 
" ... the heri t ·age should be preserved in view of 
Departmental development." (36) 
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That is, there was a possibility of the land being developed 
without a change of ownership . On that basis the decision was 
meritorous. Moreover is one example and more significantly an 
example of Maori selling to Maori sufficient basis for justifying 
relaxing the restrictions on sales from ~laori to pakeha? 
The Conuni ttee was anxious to find out 
11 
••• what the Maoris of today wish to be the law as 
to their future contracts . 11 
To find out they asked Maoris at every meeting to vote for a 
choice of three men as an indication of their feelings on S227. 
"No 1 man - I want my freedom from the Maori Land 
Court over my sales and leases. I am not the fool 
the ~.laori was years ago and I will be able to make 
better deals if I am able to make them on the spot 
and if they are not 'subject to confirmation by the 
Maori Land Court' . 
No 2 man - I want my freedom in the same \vay as the 
No 1 man and I object to the Court telling i;w whether 
I can lease or sell and generally directing what I do. 
I agree that we have made much progress and that 
things should not be as they were in the past but 
I do think that there is one thing that the Court 
can help some Maoris for a few years yet, and that 
is on the questio~ ~f price and rent. I th~nk 
that the Cou-rt should have some authority on these 
two points and no others. 
No 3 man - I know that we are at times fed up with 
the Court with all its delays and with its telling us 
what we can do with what is really our own land, but 
nevertheless the Court in just the form it is in today 
has preserved for Maoris land that would otherwise 
have slipped through their fingers. In spite of all 
we ha.ve thought and said I consider that the Court 
should be retained just as it is for some years yet" . 
Not surprisingly No 2 man was the majority choice. One can see that 
tl1e way the choices were expressed No 2 man was the natural option. The 
options were framed in a 'loaded' manner - in all the options the ~laori 
Land Court is described in negative terms even by the third man \vho is 
meant to be the advocate for the Court's wider powers. The range of 
choices play an emotive language: the emphasis is on the Maori coming 
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of age, being able to handle the pakeha world but being held back by the 
Court. This image is inherent in every choice despite the fact 
that the three men are ostensibly a range of choices from one extreme 
to the other. Within such a framework of choice the natural tendency 
would be towards the middle order, the compromise, the No 2 man . 
In addition to the way the questions were posed the procedure used 
to register opinion seems doubtful: 
"The Deputy Registrar or some other person noted 
the opinions at meetings in figures of one where 
the great majority were for one of the men and of 
half where that would nearer show the feeling. 
Adding these up we find ... No 1 man - 8 votes 
No 2 man -23 votes 
No 3 man - 7 votes 
i.e. for 38 of the meetings" {37). 
Surely a straight aggregate for each ~ ption totall ed from all of the 
meetings would have been more reliable and left no room for personal 
judgements that could not be consistently applied from meeting to meeting. 
' The writer believes on that basis the fi gures arrived at are unsatisfactory , 
In paragraph 141 the Committee says: 
"Those who supported the No 3 man were we think 
mainly men of substance who feared that any change 
might bring an increase of taxation . " 
The writer has spoken informally to a person present -at some meetings 
hel<l by the Committee . This person indicated that the "men of substance" 
were normally elders or representatives of a group of owners. Instead 
of all these owners coming along to the meeting they had sent a 
representative. When it came to counting hands the representative could 
only be counted as one despite the support that had not accompanied him. 
- 16 -
It was therefore rather unfair to say that proponents of No 3 man 
were primarily concerned with keeping the tax rate down. 
The writer believes that the grounds put forward for the repeal 
of S227 ssl(b) were extremely doubtful. The Committee's findings 
on what they perceive the majority of Maori landowners as wanting 
can be seen in a very doubtful light yet the Committee ( ~iven 
only six months in which to report) proceeded to make a recommendation 
on that basis. The result was the repeal of S227 ssl(b) and the loss 
of the Court's parental power to look at the content of resolutions of 
alienation . 
In a sense the repeal of S227 ssl(b) was merely an acknowledgement of 
what the Judges were doing already. The indications are that for 
the most part resolutions up to the time of the Amendment (under the 
old S227) were being processed as long as the consideration was 
adequate and there was no undue aggregation. 
The fact that the repeal of S227 ssl(b) did not produce a sjzeable 
increase in the number of resolutions confirmed by the Court indicates 
that the old 'good f~ith' power had been sparingly used by the Court (38). 
The Court's interpretation of "equity or good faith'.' recognised the 
possibility of a wide interpretative value but it appears that this 
possibility was seldom realised. 
This view is also borne out by the Court's decision in Re Mangatu 1, 
3 and 4 Incorporated (39). The bench indicated that there was no general 
duty cast upon it to protect Maoris in all matters affecting them and 
which properly came before the Court but there was a special duty where 
legislation provided for the exercise of such a special duty. 
The same echo is heard in Re Tauranga Taupo 2B2L45 (40) 
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"As this Court sees the position there is no magic 
in the word 'equity' or for that matter in the 
words 'to equity or good faith' as used in S227 
(1) (b) supra. That section provides that except 
as otherwise provided in the same section, no 
alienations shall be confirmed unless the Court 
is satisfied as to certain specified following 
matters." 
The Court in confirming a resolution seemed to be implicitly 
asking the question whether or not the Maori was getting the best deal 
possible (41). The necessity to retain land in Maori ownership was 
never expressed as a consideration. In this respect the Court's attitude, 
although protective was essentially assimilationist - seeing how best to 
mould the Maori into the shape of the pakeha world. 
However the Prichar<l-Waetford report obviously saw the bench 
as not being 'assimilationist' enough for as a result of the report a 
new S227 was enacted in 1967. Thi.s resulted in the Court's power to 
look at the content of resolutions being reduced to two areas: 
(a) to ensure the consideration was adequate. A new S227A was 
added to provide that the consideration was deemed to be adequate if 
the price was not less than the value of the land (ascertained by a 
special valuation pursuant to S228) with the addition of fifteen ~ercent 
to the value. 
(b) to prevent any undue aggregation of farm land ,vithin the prescribes 
of the Land Settlement and Promotion Act 1952. 
The position prior to Rata's 1974 Amendment Act was that the alienation 
of Maori Land under Part XXIII was relatively easy. The quorum 
requirements for meetings of owners were not onerous and the Court's 
protective powers had been substantially removed to be re-expressed into 
narrow and definite borders. 
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SINCE 1974 
The Court's powers under Part XXIII have been divided into 
two areas: ( 42) 
(a) power to summon meetings of owners 
(b) power to confirm, disallow or modify the resolution. 
The 1967 Amendment Act as shown, took away a lot of the Court's 
powers in (b). The Court accepted that its powers had gone 
despite the temptation to try and reassert its parental jurisdiction by 
a 'fair large ancl liberal' interpretation of its reduced powers under 
(h) . ( 43) 
Although the Government had abandoned its policy of assimi lation the 
1967 J\rnen<lment was an overt continuation of the policy. 
the 196 7 Amendment was w.i<lespreacl and mostly j ustificd: 
"The most sign.ificant aspects which the 1967 
reforms had in common w.ith their precursors 
of the second half of the nineteenth century 
Criticism of 
were the total neglect of the instructional and 
fin~ncial problems involved in helping the Maori 
to make 'better use of his land'; and , in obvious 
contrast, the smoothing of the path by which he 
might rid himself of this land to the European."(44) 
'l'he 1967 Amendment heralded the beginning of a new awareness amongst the 
Maori. Maori reaction against both the Prichard-Waetford report and the 
1967 Amendment arose with surprising speed given the relative political 
quietude of the Maori people over the preceding years. The Maori sensed that 
to bring about any concrete results they would have to start lobbying in the 
corridors of power as Sir Apirana Ngata had done many years before. More 
potent 'political clout' was needed, the traditional method of negotiation 
through the elder was becoming outdated and found sadly wanting. Ironically 
enough this meant that the only way of preserving tradition was by 
abandoning it in so far as political manoeuvre was concerned. An example 
of this burgeoning awareness is the upsurge in Maori 
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pressure groups such as Te Matakite and Nga Tamatoa over the 
past few years. 
In 1972 the Labour Party was swept into power. Matiu Rata promptly 
set about remedying some of the wrongs he believed present in the 
Maori land law legislation. On 21 November 1973 the Government White 
Paper on proposed amendments to the Maori Affairs Act 1953 was presented 
to Parliament (45). The paper observed grave concern at .... 
II the very large numbers of transactions by way of 
sale undertaken since 1967 whereby for all intents and purposes, 
the lands have gone forever from Maori ownership. 
With the strong ties between people and their land, 
the Government recognises the right of kin-groups to 
remain proprietors of their land, and intends to ensure the 
retention of as much as possible of the remaining land in Maori 
ownership and management" (46). 
Mat Rata did not return the Court 's quasi-parental jurisdiction but 
instead introduced stricter procedural requirements which ensured that the 
meetings of owners were well-attended before any alienation resolution could 
be passed. He also returned to the court much of its former jurisdiction that 
enabled it to enquire into adequacy of consideration. In essence Rata 
maintained the clear defined path of Part XXIII that 1967 had established -
that is he gave the Court none of its discretionary powers to confirm, modify 
or disallow a resolution as it had enjoyed under the old S227 ssl(b). 
Perhaps in the light of the court's earlier 'assimilationist' trend he was 
wary of the way the Court might use such discretion. If that last point of 
conjecture is true then it was proven to be wrong for around 1974 the 
Maori Land Court started taking a marked change of direction. 
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Through the years 1967 - 1974 the Court was in a period of 'limbo' 
- its parental wings had been clipped yet the Court accepted this fact 
quietly as perhaps it was bound to. However events on the political scene 
must have had their effect on the Maori Land Court for around 1974 the 
Court came out of hibernation. 
One can only guess as to whether or not there is a causal connection 
between the change in the bench's attitude and the increasing awareness 
of the Maori's inferior social position, however the writer believes the 
connection is real and too marked to be merely coincidental. The 
'connection' is evidenced by a recent practice the Court has adopted and 
two recent decisions in the Tairawhiti district. 
As stated the 1967 Amendment removed a lot of the Court's powers in (b). 
The Court has lately relocated its parental jurisdiction in power (a). 
This relocation has bee11 activated by what seems to b e a new ( or at 
least revitalised) appreciation on the bench of the significance of land to 
the Maori people . In addition there has also been claims that the new 
parental powers are not sustainable by a reasoned interpretation of the 
Act and the Court's history of usage in area (a). 
It is now necessary to investigate first of all the changes Rata made to 
procedural requirements for meetings and the Court's powers to look at 
the content of the resolutions, i.e. matters arising under category (b). 
Power {b): To Confirm, Disallow or Modify a Resolution 
i. Procedure at the Meeting 
Section 31 of the 1974 reform filled in the legal vacuum created in 1967 
and gave the Court once again direct power to ensure that: 
"the instrument of alienation has been executed and 
attested in the manner required by this Act " (47) 
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Section 36 repealed the 1967 provision which gave anyone 
of full 
age and capacity qualification to act as a proxy. The sam
e 
section repealed the 1967 provisions relating to quorum a
nd the 
court's power to fix one. 
The rules relating to proxies were changed to a position 
similar 
to the pre 1967 days. The proxy holder had to be some s
pecified relative 
of an owner. This provision was resurrected as an acknow
ledgement of 
the kinship factor inherent in Maori land under multiple 
ownership. As 
many of these people could also own shares in the land it
 is also 
an attempt to see that the votes and discretionary powers
 therein con-
ferred remain in the hands of the owners so that they can
 decide themselves 
the future use of their land. More significantly the 197
4 reform changed 
the quorum requirements. Although for a meeting to rema
in constituted 
at least three individuals entitled to vote had to be pre
sent during 
the whole time of the meeting the actual quorum requiremen
ts were tightened. 
Unde r a new subsection 6B to S309 where the proposed reso
lution is for 
the sale of land, the quorum consists of the owners togeth
er owning at 
least 75% of the beneficial freehold interest in the land.
 For leases 
the _quorum requirement lessens with the decreasing term fo
r a lease so 
that for a lease over 42 years at least 75% of the shares 
must be 
represented but for a lease of less than seven years only 
20% need 
to be represented. 
As with the pre 1967 legislation the votes are counted on 
the basis 
of the shares (48). The rationale behind this is that tho
se who occupy 
and work the land would normally have the greatest propor
tion of shares 
and as their livelihood and economic interests are affecte
d the most by the 
proposed alienation it is only fair that they have voting 
power proportionate 
to their percentage of shares in the land. This rat
ionale is sound for 
the most part, however it produces problems when the users
 of the land 
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are not significant share holders or when there is one owner who owns 
a great percentage of the shares and wishes to do something with the land 
that the other owners do not wish and because of his shares is in 
a powerful position. This paper will later investigate the approach 
at least one Judge has taken to the. problem. 
The result of the more restrictive quorum requirements was that Maori 
land became harder to alienate by Part XXIII meetings. The quorum 
requirements were undoubtedly a statutory recognition of the kinship 
factor in meetings and it was a step towards ensuring that if the pakeha 
notion of democracy was going to be enforced on the Maori it would be 
enforced in a situation where most owners had to be present as opposed 
to the old situation where they merely had the opportunity to be present. 
The difficulty of Part XXIII alienations arises because of an inherent 
nature of Maori land under multiple ownership. The land title was 
fragmented , many owners had moved away and could not~ located or if they 
could be located they simply could not afford the time or money to travel 
many miles back home for a meeting. Some of these people appoint proxies 
but most of them simply did not do anything. Their inaction did not 
necessarily arise from indifference as is often claimed. Since the Land 
March these people or absentee landowners have b e come reluctant to sell 
their land (turangawaewae) and let their 'flame' die. 
The answer to the problem does not lie in negative provisions such as 
the compulsory acquisition of uneconomic interests as this practice 
only serves to alienate the Maori people (49 ). The writer believes 
there are solutions to the problem but they lie outside the scope of 
this paper. It is sufficient to note however that the quorum requirements 
are to a small extent a mixed blessing. For absentee landowners it is a 
measure of comfort to know that their interests are relatively secure, 
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however for Maori owners working the land it can be a source of 
bedevillment when they seek to develop the land by, for instance, 
forming an incorporation and selling the land to it (50). S438 h
as 
provided one way around the latter problem. 
If the meeting lapses then under the new S315A the report of the 
lapse is passed on to the Maori Land Advisory Committee of the lo
cal 
district. The Committee in each district is composed of the D
istrict 
Officer of the Department of Maori Affairs, two officers of Gover
nment 
Departments (such as the Department of Agriculture and Fisheries) 
and four 
persons representing the Maori population of the district. There
 is therefore 
a Maori majority on the COrrunittee although these r epresentatives 
theoretically 
at least do not appear to have to be Maori. It is submitted tha
t that 
should be the case. Under S3l5A(4) the Committee after such con
sultation 
with the owners as is reasonably practicable, makes a recommendat
ion to the 
Min"ster of Maori Affairs regafding the effective use, management
 or 
alienation of the land. The Minister acts upon this recommendat
ion as 
he sees fit. 
The writer believes it is an important principle that Maori land r
emain in 
Maori ownership. It is submitted on that basis that the Comm
ittee should 
have no power to recommend an alienation by way of sale except a s
ale 
to a Maori incorporation or a Trust Board (51). Moreover it shoul
d 
have no power to recommend leases greater than a 25 year period w
ith 
statutory provision for a review of rent every five years. 
In the 
case of leases to timber companies, a right of renewal for ten yea
rs 
should be recommended with a review of rent twice during that peri
od. 
These recommendations are made as a way of balancing what is ficti
tiously 
seen to be a conflict between the need to retain Maori land in Ma
ori hands 
and the need for this country to use its small area of land to eco
nomic 
purpose. The Minister's actions should be subject to the same
 limitations. 
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That then is the new procedure for the holding of meetings and the 
ensuing consequences of the meeting lapses under the 1974 Amendment. The 
Court's power in this area is minimal and its role is a supervisory 
one to ensure that due procedure is followed. There is nothing calling 
for the exercise of the old 'parental' jurisdiction. 
ii. The Content of the Resolution. 
S31 of the 1974 reform lets the Court look at the content to ensure 
that: 
(a) the alienation does not breach any trust to which the 
land is subject 
(b) that the alienation will not result in the undue aggregation 
of farm land 
{c) 'rhat the value of any millable timber, minerals etc has 
been taken into account in ascertaining the consideration 
(d) that having regard to the relationship (if any) of the parties 
and any other special circumstances the consideration is adequate. 
Although the Court 's r0le nf ~nspection is enlarged beyond those of 
1967 there is still no return to anything like the old S227 ssl (b) powers 
of the original 1953 Act. 
The Court 's powers under category (b) (power to confirm, disallow or 
modify a resolution) as affected by the 1974 Amendment fall first for 
discussion because these legislative changes have had important ramifications
 
on the practice of the Maori Land Court. Importantly these changes, besides 
acknowledging the peculiarities of Maori land ownership, also continued 
the high degree of statutory regulation over the Court 's power and 
related aspects arising under category (b). Changes in procedure at 
meetings and power to confirm have left little room for a 'quasi - parental' 
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jurisdiction. It is against this backgroun
d of a regulated category (b) 
that the Court's use of power (a) i.e. (power 
to summon a meeting) must 
be looked . 
Power (a) Power to Summon Meetings of Owners 
The Maori Land Court has over recent years sta
rted the practice of 
directing the Recording Officer to bring certa
in matters to the attention 
of the owners . The direction to the Returnin
g Officer accompanies the 
Court ' s order to summon a meeting of owners. Th
e direction to the 
Recording Officer (or rather the advice the C
ourt gives to the own rs) can 
range from advice that r e views of rent at five
 or six more years are 
more usual to udvice that if they do not atten
d the meeting it may 
stop the resolution goin9 through (5 2 ). 
'I'hi s advi.ce the Court hu s begun giving the ow
ners through these directions 
·to the Recording Offic ·r is a milrke cl chan0e in
 direct ion. There is no 
spec ifjc provision in the Act allowing for suc
h dir ctions so this 
pr~ctice is essentially one the Court has injt
iated of i.ts own accord . 
Because this JJractice has no specific .:mchY i
11 any legislative prc•,ision 
there is no reason why the Court could not hav
e been doing it during the 
1950's and 1960's. This practice is a direct 
attempt to solve the problem 
noted earlier : to ensure that the idioms, con
cepts and implications of the 
resolution are made clear to the owners. 
The Court has constantly 
reiterated that it only has those powers which
 statutes specifically 
give it. This practice marks a departure from
 that view and evidences a 
change in direction for the court away from th
e narrow pakeha view of 
d emocratic meetings to a realisation that the 
Maori are in many ways in a 
less advantageous position than most pakeha la
ndowners. In short it 
appears to be a jump from ' assimilation' to bi
-culturalism - a desirable 
change in direction. 
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The above practice is significant because it was not activated by 
any legislative change (53). The Rata Amendment produced a new 
S307 relating to the Court's power to summon meetings of assembled 
owners (54). The most significant change was that as the Act also abolished 
the Board of Maori Affairs the advantages this body and the Crown enjoyed 
in so far as the old S307 was concerned were removed. 
Under the old S307 the Board of Maori Affairs made the application 
for the summoning of the meeting on the Crown's behalf which meant 
by the proviso to the old subsection 1 that the application did not 
have to be submitted to the Court but was processed directly by the 
Registrar. The Rata Amendment changed that position making it 
necessary for the Crown to submit an application for a meeting to the 
Court in the same way that any individual proposing alienee had to. 
This meant that the new subsection 6 gave the Court, for the first time, 
complete discretion over the summoning of meetings involving alienations 
proposed by either private interests or the Crown: 
" 'I'he summoning of a meeting shall be at 
the discretion of the Court" . 
It is against this background that two rece nt decisions of the Maori 
Land Court, in the Tairawhiti District, both decisions of the same 
Judge , can be looked at. Indeed the change noted can even provide some 
explanation £or the decisions. 
The Waipuka 2Rl Block was a 13.652 ha area of land fronting on to the 
sea, two miles from Waimarama village with the other boundary being a 
road running parallel to the shore a few hundred yards inland. The 
Pukepuke Tangiora estate owned 2100.591 shares out of a total of 5387. 
The remaining 3286.409 shares were held by 29 other owners. The land 
was leased to a J. Moeke and his wife, who also farmed adjoining land. 
On 5 August 1976 a meeting was held to cons ider a resolution to renew 
the Moeke's lease which had expired . The Trust told the meeting 
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that as the estate intended to ?Urchase the land it would vote 
against the resolution. The ~=ustee indicated to the meeting that 
it would apply to the Court fo= another me eting and would file the 
appropriate resolutions. The Court subsequently refuse d the trusts 
application for a meeting of o ·.,ne rs (55) . 
The Court saw the issue as b e i :1g: 
" ... whether or not a s •_:;)stantial owner of Maori 
land held in multiple c wnership can compel the 
sale of the land to hi:::.self by outvoting such of 
the other owners ... pre sent or r epre sented at a 
meeting of assembled m,-ners." 
The Judge, R.M. Russell, looke~ first at Section 5(j) of the Acts 
Interpretation Act 1924 which =e quired the Court to give Part XXIII such 
'fair large and liberal' const= uction as to best ensure the attainment of 
its purpose. He then looke d 2 t in Re Managatu 1, 3 & 4 Blocks (56) a cas e 
in whi c h the 'quasi-pare ntal' j uri s diction of the Court is re-affirrned. 
Hilving established the Court' s p rotective role the Judge identifies the 
d i ff e r e nce betwe en Maori conc~?tS of land and the Eng lish view. He s e es 
Part XXIII as an English atte.c-:-.? t t o acc ommodate the Maori conc ept: 
" ... Its purpose is to e:-iable owners to deal with 
their own land. It h ~s worked well in the past 
because the majority o f the owners of individual 
parcels of land have b e~n related to each other 
and the tradition has c2en that matters upon which 
there is a difference c= opinion should be discussed 
as fully as possible i~ thehope that family unity might 
be maintained by reach:.:..:1g a concensus" (57) 
The Judge points out that if t~e meeting was called the ali e nation would 
b e a formality: 
" ... since the estate c:mld expect to command a 
majority of the voti :-1,; power at any mee ting that 
might be called, ther~ was nothing that the other 
owners could do to r e::.:.st the acquisition of their 
interests in the lane: "::>y the estate" . (58) 
He finds two facts p e r s uasive . First of all if the estate became sole 
owners they would rent the 1 2....-_,:3. out to the Moekes. 
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As far as the use of the land was concerned, the alienation would 
simply maintain the status quo. Secondly the land was on Waimarama 
beach and the access was good. Evidence indicated the land's value was 
increasing and that the trust wanted to take advantage of this increasing 
value. 
In the light of the above Russell says: 
"The purpose of Part XXIII is to facilitate dealings 
with Maori land held in multiple ownership by the 
Owners of that land. The purpose was not to enable 
a suhstantial owner to dispossess the other owners 
in order to make Sfeculative profits for himself, an 
objective that he could not have achieved by partition 
or any other proceedings." (59) 
That was his basis for using the Court's discretion under S307 ss6 and 
he refused to summon a meeting of owners. 
In Re Puhatikotiko 2C3 (60) Russell extended his Waipuka decision. 
R. Coates, a person without any Maori ancestry , had as a result of the 
1967 Ame ndment Act, managed to purchase undivided interests in Maori 
land until he was the majority shareholder . He had farmed the land for a 
numbe r of years as l e ssee and finally h e sought to purchase the land 
through a Part XXIII mee ting. His application for a meeting was turned 
down. Russell reiterated that: 
"There is no way in which the owner of the majority 
interest in general land can compel the minority 
owners to sell their shares to him ... " (61) 
He says his decision in Waipuka 
" ... amounts to no more than a rule that the decision 
on whether or not to sell land to a major owner 
should be made by o.majori ty in shareholding of the 
other owners whose views can be ascertained" . 
He sees the views of the minority as being ascertainable in four ways: 
(1) the major shareholder applying for the summoning of a meeting 
of assembled owners to consider a resolution to sell the land to himself 
can agree to abstain from voting on the resolution. 
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(2 ) the Court can direct that notice of the h e arin
g of the 
application to summon the meeting be give n to all o
wne rs, so that any 
owners opposing sale may attend the Court h e aring a
nd oppose the calling 
of the meeting . The court, in the light of submiss
ions from both sides , 
then decides whether or not to summon the meeting. 
(3 ) t he Court c a n follow the practice it has alrea
dy adopted . 
It can call the meeting but direct the Recording Of
fice r to inform the 
owners of t he quorum requirements and if they are o
ppo s ed to sale how to 
use them to their advantage . 
(4 ) in cases where the major owne r proposes altern
ative r e solu tions 
to sell or lease a discussion c a n b e h e ld before th
e me eting is formally 
ope n e d ... . 
" If the applicant find s that the r e are owne rs who 
oppo s e sale and are like ly to l e ave b e fore the 
me eting ope n s h e will undertak e not to vote his 
share s on the s a le r e solution in r e turn for those 
own e rs agree ing to r e ma in at the meeting and cons id
e r 
his lease res olution." 
Coates rejected any of thes e ' prac tical solutions'. 
"All these practi c r1l solutions proceed on the basis 
that t h e othe r owne rs should b e given an opportunity
 
of d e ciding whe the r or not to s e ll the ir land but 
that a major owner should not b e allowed to oust his
 
co-owners on his own t e rms " 
None of these ' practical solutions ' are require d an
d laid down by statute 
y e t it seems that the Court can impose them in one 
form o r anothe r . Failure 
to follow these solutions at a me eting if it was un
de rtaken to do so could 
doubtlessly al l ow the Court to r e fus e to confirm an
y ensuing resolution on 
the grounds that t he resolution had not bee n execut
e d properly . 
Russell ' s ' practical solutions ' are essentially way
s of finding out what the 
majority of the minority wants . He does not wan
t to constrain a minority 
to submit to something which is unfair to them. Mo
s t note able is his second 
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'practical solution'. What this solution means is that the Court can 
hold an 'unofficial' meeting of owners and find out how they feel. 
After gauging the probable outcome of an official meeting the Court can 
adjudicate upon that probable outcome. How would the Court look at that 
outcome? In the light of Russell's two decisions the words of the old 
S227 ssl(b) ring: 
"contrary to equity, or good faith, or to the 
interests of the Maori alienating ." 
This is clearly a reappe arance of the quasi-parental jurisdiction, the 
only change being that the power is exercised a step earlier than in the 
pre 1967 days and that the Court's powers of modification are somewhat 
reduced. Instead of looking at the content of the r e solution after a 
meeting has passed it, the court is now looking at the content of the 
resolution b efore d eciding whether or not to summon a meeting. Hence it 
is also a relocation of the parental jurisdiction. 
Russell ' s d ecision in Puhatikotiko 2C3 is pending appeal (62) and it is 
hard to know whether the line these two cases have s tarted will be continued. 
Two of the grounds for appeal are tha~ the court has acted wrongly in its 
exercise of a statutory discretion and that it has usurped the owner's 
franchise: The writer cannot see how these grounds can be satisfactorily 
made out. There is first of all no provision directing the use of this 
discretion and secondly the 'practical solutions ' Russell offered appear 
to be reasonable and ensure that the opinion of the majority of the 
landowners (as opposed to a majority based on possession of shares ) is 
realised. Of course the Court is not directly empowered to order any of 
the practical solutions and in this sense the Court can be quite clearly 
seen as moving away from the notion that it only has those powers that 
..., 
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legislation specifically gives it. However if the Maori Appellate 
Court upholds Russell's decision it is likely that they will confine 
this revamped parental power to situations where a majority shareholder 
seeks to use his majority to compel the minority to sell to him. 
In the light of the high degree of regulation of power {b), the 
recent practices of the Court under power (.a.) can be seen as a 
minor ressurection and relocation of the quasi-parental jurisdiction away 
from power (b) due to statutory intervention into category (a). 
Persons unhappy with the idea of assimilation can be pleased with the 
approach the Court is taking. Most Maori agree tha~ the courts parental 
power is desirable and, arguably, even more so today now that the bench 
has shown its willingness to take explicit account of Maori feeling. It 
is to be hoped that the Maori Land Court will continue to be sensitive to 
Maori feeling. Perhaps the ~Europeanized' mode of leadership emerging in 
the Maori will ensure that that will always be the case. The Court is 
however still a statutory creature so any legislative intrusion might 
upset the fine balance that exists today between the bench and its attitudes 
to Part XXIII meetings; if there is to be any intrusion it must be of a 
positive nature. 
For the most part mutuality exists between the bench and the Maori however 
there is a possibility that the 'fine balance' might be upset by an over-
zealous Court over-reaching itself. S438 might, and has come close to being 
that 'spanner in the works' S438 has become increasingly used mainly as 
a result of Rata's tightened quorum requirements. It is the writer's view 
that it contains some undesirable elements that can be removed without 
hindering its purpose. 
Section 438. 
S 438 of the Maori Affairs Act 1953 provides a device for the Maori Land 
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Court to vest land in trustees. Subsection 1 prov
ides: 
"For the purpose of facilitating the use, 
management, or alienation of any Maori freehold 
land, or any customary land or any general land own
ed 
by Maoris, the Court, upon being satisifed that the
 
owners of the land have, as far as practicable, bee
n 
given reasonable opportunity to express their opini
on 
as to the person or persons to be appointed a trust
ee 
or trustees, may, in respect of that land, constitu
te a 
trust in accordance with the provisions of this sec
tion." 
The purpose of s438 is to facilitate the handling o
f land when the owners 
cannot be traced or located (i .e. a quorum for a P
art XXIII meeting cannot 
be obtained) or when it is necessary to protect the
 owners interests. S438 
is often seen as being complementary to Part XXIII 
- a Part XXIII meeting 
lapses, the Maori Land Advisory Corrunittee reports a
nd a s438 trust is 
constitu'lled (though not necessarily based upon the 
Advisory Committee's 
report). 
Before discussing proposed changes to the current s
438 it must be stressed 
that for the most part s438 has been used positivel
y and desirably, indeed 
some of the legislative amendments the writer recom
mends are followed as a 
matter of course by the Court . The White Paper
 on Maori Land noted the 
beneficial aspects of s438: 
"The process has proved remarkably acceptable to th
e 
Maori owners generally, affording them responsibili
ty 
in dealing with their own lands, also involvement 
and identification therewith. Many, many thousands
 of 
acres of land have been so put to use with resultan
t 
productivity as a consequence." (63) 
The writer is concerned to remove some undesirable 
elements from s438 
(as evidenced by two recent examples) whilst also r
etaining the benefits 
observed by the White Paper. 
s438 in its present form has been significantly alt
ered from its original 
form in the 1953 Act. One of the most significant 
changes was that 
precipitated by the 1966 Court of Appeal judgement 
is Hereaka v. Prichard 
(64 ). At the time of the case subsection 1 of S438
 provided : 
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"The Court may, on application made to it in that behalf 
or of its own motion during the course of any proceedings 
before it, make an order under this section vesting any 
customary land or Maori freehold land or land owned by 
Maoris in any trustee or trustees, to be held upon and 
subject to such trusts as the Court may declare for the 
benefits of Maoris .... " (my underlinir.,f 
Hereaka concerned litigation over the trouble-ridden Rangatira Band C 
Blocks. The central issue concerned whether or not the Maori Land Court 
could create a trust vesting land in a trustee in order to transfer it to 
the Taupo County Council for various purposes. In the light of sub-
section l (as it then was) the Court held that any S438 trust must have as 
its object the benefit of Maoris and it is not sufficient if its direct 
result is for the benefit of someone else and it benefits the Maori only 
indirectly. In other words the Maori must be the cestuis que trust. The 
Court's reasoning turned directly upon the words ofsubsection 1: "for the 
benefit of Maoris ..... " 
Sl42 (1) of the Maori Affairs Amendment Act 1967 provided an entirely 
new S438. The Prichard-Waetford report made no recommendations concerning 
S438 so far as Hereaka was concerned however the total removal of the 
words upon wh~ch that judgement turned lea3 unc to the inescapable 
conclusion that the legislative intended to realise North P's ominous 
words in that case: 
" .... that this is really a trust providing for the 
alienation of the land to a stranger, and it cannot 
possibly be said that the land is held on trust for 
the benefit of the Maoris" . 
Moreover the judges indicated in that case that powers of alienation, 
as provided for in S438, only arose as an 'incidental' power of the 
trustees. That is, in most cases trusts established for the sole purpose 
of alienation were outside the Maori Land Court's jurisdiction unless it 
could be shown that the alienation directly benefited the owners. 
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There can be no doubt that the Court of Appeal decision severely 
lessened the potential of the old S438 as an alienation device. However, 
as noted, a new section emerged soon after that judgement. In the f..~ore 
over other changes to the Act during 1967 the changes to S438 were largely 
invoiced. The new S438 made it possible for trusts to be established 
for the purpose of alienating the land. The words in the new subsection 1 
are unmistakeably clear; 
"for the purpose of facilitating the use, management 
or alienation of any Maori freehold land ...... " 
In short whereas the old S438 prevented trusts being established solely 
to facilitate the alienation of Maori Land the 1967 Amendment made it a 
distinct possibility. It is submitted that the old S438 was distinctly 
preferable to the present one. Turning now to look at the present section ... 
1975 
In~Albe rt v Nicholson (65) the Supreme Court held that a s438 trust 
could be imposed despite the wishes of the majority of owners. As s438 
is des igned for situations where a quorum cannot be obtained the writer 
believes the Court should not b e competent to impose a trust upon a group 
of owne:r.s who can produce a 75% quorum. It is submitt2d that it should 
be a statutory requirement that the Court append a certificate to all s438 
trusts stating that the trust is being established because either a quorum 
could not be obtained or because the owners had passed a resolution calling 
for one at a duly constituted Part XXIII meeting. If the 'certificate' 
requirement and its accompanying prerequisites had been the law then the 
problem of the apparently 'undemocratic' situation in Albert would never 
have arisen. THe suggested limitations on the situations in which a 
s438 trust can be established could be neatly fitted as a proviso to 
subsection 1. 
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Besides defining the instances for a s438 trust it is submitted that 
the Court's wide powers of appointment of trustees must be restricted. 
It should be a statutory requirement that the majority of trustees be 
owners of the land. There is provision for advisory trustees who can 
be drawn from specialist ranks such as the Department of Agriculture or 
the owners solicitor. The recommended requirement would prevent the 
situation where an insurance company had been appointed trustee over land 
which it wished to acquire for itself! 
Subsection 1 provides owners with an opportunity t o express their opinion 
upon proposed trustees but not the actual imposition of the trust. Both 
of these stages are important: Stage 1 - the imposition of the trust; stage 2 
- the appointment of trustees . Even if s438 is being used where a quorum 
cannot be obtained is it right that the owners who can be positively 
ascertained only have a right of protest at stage 2? If any owners have grounds 
for believing that the trust itself need not be established they should have 
a statutory right to say so. However this right would probably be rarely 
exercised if the ambit of s438 was limited by the suggested proviso to 
subsection 1. 
The Court had wide powers over the terms 0£ the trust. Subsection 5 
provides that: 
"The order made by the Court may confer on the trustee 
or trustees such powers, whether abolute or 
conditional, as the Court thinks fit, but, subject to 
any express limitations or restrictions, the trustees 
shall have all such powers and authorities as are 
necessary for the effective performance of the tursts." 
The court by virtue of subsection 3 can modify the order creating the trust 
at any time. Paragraph (b) gives the Court power to vary the terms of 
the trust by making a ne w trust order in substitution for the previous one . 
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The Ngatihine dispute illustrates the potential of the Court's power 
of modification. 
The Ngatihine block occupies 13,262 acres of relatively unused Northland 
land. In March 1974 the Maori Land Court appointed a trust under S438. 
At the first meeting of the trust it is recorded that the trust was 
formed to initiate the formation of an Incorporation a nd that the Secretary 
was to contact forestry companies to ascertain if they had any interests 
in forestry in that area. It seems that this was not done as Carter Holt 
had already worked out detailed plans for the use of the b.lock. It also 
appears that this plan was made at least seven months before the Court 
created the s438 trust. The trustees decided to lea~ the land to 
Carter Holt but one trustee Graham Alexander refused to do so because he 
believed that the lease was disadvantageous and that not enough 'shopping 
around' had been done. When Alexander refused to sign the lease the other 
trustees made an application to remove Alexander from the trust. Alexander 
appealed against his removal and was s ubsequently reinstated in August 
1976. However the Maori Appellate Court acting under the powers given it 
by s435 ssS altered the terms of reference of the trust. Ic de fined the 
terms of reference as being the leasing of land to Carter Holt Farm and 
Forestry Ltd., with some modification to the original lease. 
The write r has no wish to discuss the merits of the Carte r Holt lease as 
arguments can be made both for and against it (66). What should be noted 
is that the Court's power of modification can easily become one of manipulation: 
Alexander by refusing to sign the lease is acting in contempt of court (67). 
It is therefore submitted that once the Court has decided to impose a s438 
it should have no power of modification except in response to an application 
by the trustees asking the Court to modify the t erms so that a specified 
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action is not ultra vires the trustees, powers. That requirement would 
have prevented the Court using its powers in a (positively or negatively) 
coercive way. Also the ultra vires requirement would prevent the other 
trustees 'ganging up' on a dissentient by threatening legal action - the 
emphasis would be on solving the problem internally. 
The Maori Land Advisory Committee should have a greater role in the 
establishment of s438 trusts. Particularly for land that is not being 
put to economic use the Committee should conduct a detailed land usage 
survey (subject to the writer's proposed limitations on its power to 
recommend alienations). Consultation with owners should be paramount 
for this survey. The purpose of the study would be to explore how to 
get maximum utility out of the land's current ownership. 
Once a Part XXIII meeting has lapsed the result gets referred to the 
Advisory Committee. The Committee should then proceed to make the land 
usage survey (together with recommendations on prospective trustees) 
and submit it to the Court. The Court in establishing the trust should 
take the Committee's recommendations in to account especially in defining 
the terms of the trust. 
One of the major features of S438 trusts is that if the trustees decide 
to dispose of the land then under subsection 7 the alienation does not 
have to be confirmed by the Govt although the registrar has to be notified. 
The Prichard-Waetford report looked at s438 and its' history (68) in respect 
of alienations under the "'a~~~ of a s438 trust: 
"In very many cases the Maori Trustee was 
appointed and he found during his early trusteeship 
that the waiting for a Court and the formal appearance 
in it was too protracted. Thereupon an amendment to 
the Act was passed providing that when he is appointed 
Trustee, confirmation is unnecessary'' . 
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The Committee went on: 
"It has been submitted to us that such freedom of 
confirmation should be extended to all trustees appointed 
under s438 on the grounds that they should not be appointed 
unless they are competent to carry out the t erms of the 
trust. We agree but consider that there should be not 
freedom from confirmation but confirmation as of right 
on the filing of a simple application• . 
The Committee's recommendation was followed and s438 alienations became 
entitled to confirmation simply upon the Registrar noting the alienation, 
The writer cannot submit to the principle of confirmation 'as of right' 
because firstly he believes that administrative expediency is insufficient 
reason for justifying the important relaxation and secondly because of his 
distate for 'alienation' trusts where the terms of the trust conflict 
with the principle of retaining Maori land in Maori ownership being 
created solely to facilitate alienation. 
It i s submitted that 'alienation' trusts should be subject to: 
a) the alienation limitations recommended for the Maori Land Advisory 
Committee 
b) the limitations envisaged in the Hereaka case . 
If the writers recommendations were in operation then h e could submit 
to the notion of confirmation as of right b ecause alienations by S438 
would become more of a rarity and more the result of a considered decision 
rather than as a legal loop-hole through which to avoid Part XXIII - a 
'land use' provision rather than an 'alienation' device . 
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Summary of recorrunendations concerning s438 
(1) That the original subsection 1 be returned so that th
e decision iH 
Hereaka v Prichard become s good law once again - the tru
st must directly 
and not indirectly benefit the Maori. 
(2) That a s438 trust can only be constituted by the Cou
rt in two situations: 
i) where a Part XXIII meeting has failed to obtain a 
quorum 
ii) where a duly Part XXIII meeting has passed a resoluti
on 
calling for a s438 trust (as a precursor to, say, 
incorporation) . 
The Court must append a certificate that either of the two
 conditions is met 
when the order creating the trust is made. 
(3) Th e majority of trustees must be owners of the land w
ith advisory 
trustees drawn from areas of expertise. 
(4) Owners who do not want a trust, notwithstanding the 
recommendations in 
(2) should have a right to be h eard. 
(5) The Court should hav8 no power to modify the terms o
f the trust 
except on application by the trustees who can only make such an applicati
on 
to e n s ure that a certain course of action is not ultra vir
es. 
(6) That trustees be limited in their powers of alienation similar to 
those recommended by the writer for the Maori Land Advisor
y Corrunittees. 
The writer believes that these proposals would produce a c
oherent 
pattern of Maori Land use where the emphasis is on retaini
ng the land 
in multiple ownership . The cultural need for the Maori to
 retain the·,r-
turangawaewae is compatible with the economic demands of t
he country. 
The mere fact of fragmented title does not mean that a pie
ce of land 
cannot be utilized - there are devices to surmount that pr
oblem such as 
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incorporation, s438 trusts and Trust Boards. 
The recommendations made concerning s438 ultimately involve the 
education of the Maori people, putting tools in their hands not taking 
the rustic ones they already have out of their hands into better educated 
and financed pakeha ones. If the Maori is less able to develop his own 
land then the pakeha as the person who has imposed his culture upon the 
Maori must take responsibility. S438 as it stands at present has a lot 
of flaws in it. It is potentially coercive (as is perhaps shown in the 
Ngatihine situation) and can be used despite the wishes of the owners (Albert 
v Nicholson) (69) MOre importantly it can lift the court into the 
realm of political controversy - an extremely undesirable situation given 
the almost invariably positive role the b e nch plays in protecting the 
Maoris rights. S438 can possibly be the resort of over-zealous judges 
believing they know what is best for the Maori and acting accordingly. 
There is a vast differe nce b e tween exercising a ' quasi-parental ' protective · 
role and exerting a parentally authoritative power. 
S438 is undoubtedly neede d however the writer believes that the proposed 
changes would not hamper its positive area of operation noted by the 
White Paper. Certainly the proposals would have prevented the Ngatihine 
and Albert situations. In the Ngatihine block a trust was definitely needed 
(a quorum could not be obtained) but the trustees should have been left to 
find their own way to develop the land (7e). IN Albert a trust was not 
needed as there was a majority available. If the owners of the block in 
the latter case felt unable to develop the land themselves then they should 
have been able to vote for the establishment of a s438 trust to deal with 
the land. 
As time goes on the title to many parce ls of Maori land will become more and 
more fragmented. Pressures from the Pakeha world to use this land for economic 
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purposes will increase. S438 will be in the centre of that development. 
S438 is in need of amendment for as that trend progresses pressures on 
the bench from the pakeha world to use s438 as a device to alienate Maori 
Land will increase. If that pressure is halted by limiting s438's 
operation then, the writer believes, that the Maori owners can retain 
their turangawaewae yet feel assured that the land is being utilized. 
S438 can (even in its present form) play a large role in the future of 
Maori land under multiple ownership however its metes and bounds must be 
clearly defined. 
The alienation of Maori land under multiple ownership can be done 
by several other methods besides Part XXIII and s438 (most noteably by 
Proclamation). The two methods discussed in this paper are perhaps the 
most significant. The attitude of the Maori Land Court bench to questions 
of alienation has, as shown, moved away from the notion of 'assimilation' 
however the potential of s438 could negate that positive attitude through 
a Court over-reaching itself moving from parental protection to parental 
authority. The Court's protective powers must clearly be retained but 
its wide powers in s438, an open invitation to unjustifiable interference, 
must be stemmed. 
Land is the touchstone to Maori culture - it is all important. It 
is up to the pakeha-settler to see that that culture is preserved. 
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'l'his paper began as an attempt to look at developrnents 
wi thin the ~aori Land Court concerning the attitude and approaches 
the bench was taking to Maori land . The writer believ e d (and still 
does) that the bench was try ing to re-establish a form of the old 
parental jurisdiction . The tide of political events in the area was 
offered as an explanation for the obvious change in attitude . It 
is also important to remember the r1:aori Land Court judges tend to 
be come somev1hat understandably a little insular, to thimk the ;r live 
in a world of their (?Wn. In addition they sometirr.es are j_nclined 
to forget that they are a statutory court ancl more importantly that 
rheir decisions can be appealed to the traditi ona l Supreme Coourt/ 
Court of Appeal heirachy. 
Bearing the above in mind three recent happenings are of 
sufi'lcent :i.mport to justify this addendum . 'l'he ,y are: 
1) The unreported Supreme Court de cisi on of ~ahon,J. 
in r•e __ the N_e·a t.ihj_ne Block del iv ered in Auckls.nd, 28Ju1y 1978 
2) the Maor·i Appel la tc Cour·t ' s refusal to rule on 
a technical point in re Puhatikotilrn 2C3 and t he subsequent 
" 
f orwardJ.ng of the whole· issue to the Supreme Court. 
3) 1'he recently introduced Maori Affairs Bill 1978; and 
r'ecently announced Royal Commission on the t:aori Land Court . 
The Ngatihine decision falls first for discussion because 
the v,riter believes it will have repercussions on. ho v, Puhatikotiko 
will be decided . Before the Supreme Court in Ngat ihine the 
appe llant Alexander asked the Court for orders quashing or setting 
aside the following decisions: 
i) The order of the Maori Land Court removing the 
applicant (Alexander) from office as trustee on 14 July 1975 . 
ii) That part of the order of the Appellate Court of 
12 August 1976 which directed the trustees to execute a 
new lease; the part of the Appellate Court order which 
L 
reinstated the applicant as trustee was not attacked . 
iii) The order of the Maori Land Court made on 6 fiecembe 
1977 reooving the applicant as trustee . 
Note that with respect to the first and third points 
they were l odged together i n one application. All Counsel agreed 
that if the Court found for the appl i cant on the second issue 
then the other app l ication must also succeed . On that basis the 
Judge dealt with the second issue first . 
Perhaps a point not made expl icit enough in the paper was 
that when the Appellate Court altered the terms of the trust they 
did so pursuant to a Forestry Consultant's report . The Court had 
8CmI,1-Lssioneda 'l'aupo consultant to report upon the lease . Upon receipi 
of his report the court using s438 proceeded to modify the terms of 
the tr·u.s t i.n accord with the report . The consideration was to be 
fixod by the Forestry Consultant and the terms of the new lease 
were to be mutually settled by cour1sel for the beneficial owners 
and. by cc.Yu.nse l for the t1·us t ees . 'l'.he Court's actions in that 
roqlet;t cnn be clear ly seen as parenta1,what they were doing was 
invc.:stj_gating the merit of the original l ease. . The question arose 
as ~o whsther or not the Cou.·L had jurisdiction to do that. 
Couns e l for the Appellate Court ars ued that the 
nubstitiuted trust order was within the Court ' s jurisdiction. He 
po:inted to the traditional guardianship role the Court has.. had 
ov0r l\,aori interests. Counsel also made three substantive 
cubmissions . It was f:i.rst argued that the allegation of the 
ap)l lcant did not go to any question of jurisdiction because the 
Appe llate Court had power to substitute a nev, trust order pursuant 
to ci/~3 13(3 ) (b) which provides that in respect of a trust already 
co~istituted under that section the Court may -
" vary the terms of the trust by making a nev, trust 
order in substi tutdlon for the existing trust order . 1' 
Secondly it was argued as a matter of authority that the 
subs t:i.. tuted trust order was in fact and in law a 11 variation11 in terms 
of ,s438 (3) (b) . Pinally it was submitted that if. there vms not 
a v&riation then what the Court had done amounted to a new trust 
order, a course auitorized by subsectipp. 3(c) of s438 in combination 
with s438 (2). 
The Judge found that the order the Court made was in 
excess of jurisdiction because the terms of the lease necessarily 
usurped some of the powers of the trustees . 
11 It was for the trustees , and not for the Forestry 
c onsultant, to settle with the Company what the c onsideration 
of the lease was to be . The nature and substance of the - . ~ 
order , therefore,was to deprive the trustees of t~eir 
statutory right to adrninister the trust in accordance with 
the terms declared by the Maori Land Court , and to ~est 
that power in delegates appointed by the Maori Appellate 
Court. 11 
He goeo on to say: 
11 1rhe 1967 amendment represented Parliamentary 
recogni t:ion of the onward march of the r-.:aori race towards 
equo.lity with Europeans in the free d om of alienation of 
land . Alienation by individual owners is still restricted 
insofar as it r·e quire s confirmation by the Maori Land 
Court. But trustees for s p ecified benefiicial owners duly 
appointed under s438 ma y sell or lease Maori land on 
behalf of the b enefici a l owners without l e t or hindrance 
ancl tha t right is not to be qualifi ectr or destroyed by any 
for, .. of we ll-me ant jud icia l inLervention , so long as it is 
exercis e d in terms of the emp owerin 3 trust . " 
Mahon wa G p:ro·bab ly c once rne d tha t t he conditi on i~posed 
·b,</ the Court was a backdoor WDY of r e-introducing the old 
r e(1u:Lrement of th e Court's confirmation of s 438 aliena tions - a 
f e atu r e which disappeared in 1967 . His ration ale amour..ts to a rule 
that the Court can impose no conditions tha t arnount to it exercising 
o.ny of i.ts powers under ? art XIX of the Act r1hich it would use in 
CO!tfirmi ng any other alienation of kaori land . Subsection 7 makes 
i. t pla:i.n that the Court is n ot to confirm any alienation by trustee s 
Jn \': h orn land is vested under the section . That rational~ is 
e;,:d,:.:i. i.nl y sus t aLr1able and u nder l ies Mahon's ju · gement. 
The problem ia that that reasoning might se em to conflict 
wi. th o ther provisions of the section which CJ.U ~ te clearly g ive the 
~ .P~-,...._:, c,f- '--''-"•~ 
Cou 1'L powe:es to establish a trust;\::;ha-:t, they d'e termine beforehand in 
a ' pa r ental' way . Section 5 provides: 
,11.; I ( ILJTU 
11 The order made by the Court may confer on the 
trustee or trustees such poVters, whether absolute o
r 
condit:ional, as the Court thinks fit,but, subject t
o any 
express limitations or restrictions, the trustees s
hall 
have all such powers and authorities as are neceass
ary 
for the effective performance of the trusts.'' 
Moreover subsection 3 woul~ seem to give the Court powers
 
eas ily interpreted as being capable of being exerci
sed parentally 
by virtue of the fact that they can be exercised ''a
t any time''. 
How then is the apparent conflict to be reconciled?
 '.fi th 
respect to ~ahon,J. the writer believes his decisio
n to be wrongly 
decj_ded on the facts though his r·ationale is suppo
rtable to a 
certain extent. 
One must look at exactly what the Court's powers un
der Part 
I.IX are. Essent ially the power of conf irmation of a
n alienation 
is a review of a conditional c ontract. the maori has
 already 
e 11tered into (conditi onal upon confirmation by the 
Court). The 
effect of subsec tion 7 i s that the Court cannot impose an
y 
ccndit :Lons that amount to confir·mation of' c11icnati.o
ns - that is, a 
condition that makes Any contract of a lienati~n the
 tr~stees enter 
into co~ditisn~l upon Court approval. 
There is a difference between that s:L tuation and th
e one 
where the Court can regulate the activities of the 
trustees 
before the contract is entered by virtue of its pow
er in defining 
the terms of the trust. 'l'o reduce the discussion so
 far into a 
proposition: the Court can r~gulate and impose cond
itions relating 
to the content of the contract of alienation the tr
ustees 
ultimately enter into .(subsections 3 and 5), however the Court 
cannot impose conditions that would amount Lo its c
onfirming Lho 
transaction after the c ontract of a lienation has be
en entered into. 
The above seems the only way of reconciling kahon's
 
dec lsion with the whole of the section. Unfortunate
ly it is a 
reconciliation that accords with some of his reason
ing but not with 
his decision on the facts. 
The writer is therefore some1vvhat vvary of Lahon 's decision . . 
Nevertheless its effect might be to curb the over-zealousness the 
Court has shown in its use of the section . That is desirable to 
a certain extent havvever the basic objections to s438 remain and 
mahon has done nothing (and could realistically have done next to 
nothing) to relieve those objections . Legislative action not 
judicial decision is the only answer . 
However Mahon ' s decision is clearly a ' smack on the 
bottom ' for the r.:aori Land Court and l ts effect migh t be to dampen 
the Court ' s attempts to introduce a revamped parental jurisdiction 
jn other areas . 
In re Puhatikotiko the Maori Appellate Court had appointed 
a Napier lav1yer , V:r 'r Gallon, to represent the absent landowners 
and to contest the appeal by the proposing alienee . Counsel for 
the cr.p-pel lant claimed that counsel should also be appointed for 
those aDsentee owners favouring the sale. The Appellate Court 
refused to rule on the point o.nd directed Lhe cJ.ppellant to go to 
tlH: ~3uprcme Court oh that po:Lnt so counsel rr:oved the whole issue 
1/i.. tli.out a doubt Part XXIII has even less potential than 
s438 as a repository for the parental jurisdiction. If the Supreme 
Court was so keen to s trike away much of the Court ' s parental 
efforts in s438 then it is not to hard to forsee the Court also 
doing that in this appeal . In addition the indications are that 
11:&.hon ,J. will adjudicate upon the issue. If he follows his 
.Qg_~tll:!_i..ne approach and looks at the history of Part XXIII he 
m:i.ght readily and qui t_e safely come to the conclusion that Part 
x:nrI excludes the parental jurisdiction. 'l'o s ome e x tent that 
ca r1clusion would be supported by the part of this paper that notes 
ho\J Part XXIII powe1·s have become more regulated and defined. 
The chances are therefore that Russell ' s re-vrunped parental 
jur:Lsdiction v1i ll be over-ruled . 
Cynical observers have said that the recent happenings 
noted in the addendum could spell the end of the J·/aori Land Court 
as it is -~ present constituted. 'rhey argue., perhaps with some 
for ce that an administrative matter such as the surnrnoning of a 
) 
mee ting should never have to get as far as the Supreme Court, it 
is a symptor.1 that the Niaori Land Court is too far into its own 
little world. Ngatihine can readily be construed as sup~orting 
that cynicism.Purther v,eight can be gained from the term·s of 
reference of the Royal Commission which require it to look at 
the justifications for the Court's existence and to see nhether or 
not the Court is properly performing its functions. Possibly 
another sign is the recent postponing of some scheduled appointments 
to the Maori Land Court bench. Certainly there are good grounds 
for the cyni cal observation noted. 
However whatever is the outcome of the above the 
introduction of the r. ,ao ri Affairs Bill into the House of 
Representatives recently and the fact that iL wi ll be going before 
ct Select Gornmittee means that at last some attempts are being made 
to find out how the ~aori feel about the proce8ses that regulate 
the ir land. 
The writer closes with the obser~ation that perhaps the 
Roya l Commission and the Bill (which for the purposes of this 
f"cf"'x> 
paJJe r ~ no change in the l aw) are simply political ways of 
taking the heat out of the Maori Land issue. 
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